The availability of natural resources such as water, forests, and land throughout the world has decreased over time (both in terms of quantity and quality) as a result of development, urbanization and expansion of agriculture. Forests have been converted to agricultural lands, land erosion has increased, water bodies have been polluted by industrial and urban wastes, and aquifers have been contaminated by agricultural wastes (such as pesticides) and salt water intrusion (resulting from over pumping groundwater).
The inevitable consequences of increased demand for, and decreased supply (including deteriorating quality) of various natural resources, especially water, is an increase in the value of these scarce resources and their services, leading to increased competition over their allocation. Consequently, there is a greater need for comprehensive and stable arrangements of a sustainable nature, that will satisfy all parties involved, directly and indirectly.
Regional conflict, negotiation, and cooperation are three possible steps in a process that results in an economic and institutional system that may, under certain conditions, lead to regional arrangements dealing with resource allocation and management. In this chapter, we discuss the conditions under which a regional cooperative arrangement is possible, and to what degree economic considerations alone provide the basis for cooperation.
Economic concepts are extremely applicable in the case of resource conflicts arising from market failure. Such concepts can be used to design institutions and organizational solutions in terms of rules and structures that are socially desirable. Likewise they identify solutions associated with gains to all parties involved in the conflict (Loehman and Dinar, 1995) . The literature provides several methods that may be adapted to identifying cooperative solutions. After familiarizing ourselves with cooperative principles in the next section, we will briefly review several approaches and demonstrate how they have been applied to water resourcerelated cooperative analyses. This section will be followed by several examples of actual cases of cooperation over water from various parts of the world. The lessons learned are summarized in the concluding section.
(ECONOMIC) PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION
Cooperation, in a general sense, is defined as a process through which individuals and groups may move up from one level of social development to the next more prosperous one (Bogardus, 1964) . Several principles of cooperation are described in the literature. The most important include: (1) the democracy principle of managing the cooperative arrangement, (2) the voluntary principle of joining and leaving the cooperative arrangements, (3) the autonomy principle of selfsustainability, (4) the equity principle of participating and sharing benefits, and (5) the universality principle of having a set of goals that attract all participants (e.g., Bogardus, 1964) . In addition, economically optimal arrangements of a cooperative nature have to fulfill an economic efficiency requirement. Such arrangements should be associated with additional gains to the participants. They also have to address issues of justice and fairness associated with the allocation of the resulting benefits or the joint cost. These points will be demonstrated and elaborated later.
Cooperative participation in design and scale, and mutually planned sharing of costs and benefits, are likely to lead to more effective exploitation of a resource. This is in contradistinction to unilateral undertakings by the parties, exhibiting no coordination. In general, where inter-dependencies exist, pooling the resource potential of an entire river system, for example, offers a wider range of technically feasible alternatives. In addition, by avoiding duplication of investment, the cooperative strategy provides the parties with an opportunity to select the most economical combination of physical sites along the basin for joint utilization of the river.
Cooperation Difficulties
Given the apparent advantages inherent in the cooperative development of an international river, why have such undertakings proceeded slowly. There are several reasons: (1) technical complexity of the cooperative project (e.g., Waterbury, 2002; Just and Netanyahu, 1998) , (2) ill-defined rights and responsibilities of each riparian (e.g., Dinar, 2004) , (3) the existence of differing goals that cannot be represented by a simple balance of costs and gains to the riparians concerned, and (4) the existence of additional considerations (nonwater related issues, such as economic and political) among the riparians and other stakeholders (Kibaroglu, 2002) .
For example, in the Nile Basin, there are a number of factors making cooperation more difficult (Waterbury, 1996 (Waterbury, , 2002 . They include: (1) high rainfall variability over time and across the basin states, (2) divergent economic growth rates, (3) high population growth rates, and (4) growing water-related needs necessitating immediate action rather than a long-term vision. Also, potential nonsignificant contributions of various basin states may diminish their role in a cooperative arrangement, because they will have very little to offer.
Contrary to the perception that a "grand coalition" (the group of all parties that can cooperate -all riparian states that share the river basin) is associated with the highest total benefit from cooperation, Just and Netanyahu (1998) observe that basin-wide multilateral agreements are less common than agreements among only a subset of the riparians (see also Chapter 2). Their observations that (1) the performance of multilateral organization is negatively correlated with the number of signatories and (2) that negotiations over international water resources tend to yield bilateral arrangements in higher frequency than multilateral arrangements, lead them to challenge the grand coalition perception. According to the authors, a grand coalition imposes transaction costs on each coalition member, due to inner coalition monitoring problems, and the free rider problem. Hence the authors support a "partial coalition" since it may offer greater net economic benefits to be shared between the parties and a higher level of sustainability in cooperation over time (Just and Netanyahu, 1998) . Consequently, one may expect some dis-economies of scale in enforcement costs of larger group arrangements and economies of scale in benefits accrued from bigger water investments stemming from larger coalitions (see Chapter 5).
According to the above indicators, the likelihood of a cooperative arrangement is affected by the behavior of the net benefit obtained from adding additional riparians. One scenario could be that the likelihood may increase with the number of participating parties up to a point where the difference between benefits and cost is in its maximum level and thereafter the likelihood decreases. Another possibility is that enforcement costs exceed benefits up to a point where, as with additional participants, the benefits become so significant that they surpass enforcement costs and cooperation is justified.
These points are important and should be considered carefully. The only question that arises is whether or not many partial agreements provide a more stable environment for regional cooperation than one grand multilateral agreement. In terms of time gained during negotiations, and better resource management in the short run, several partial agreements may be better. However, a long-term analysis is needed as well. A possible compromise includes a sequential pattern in which initially partial cooperative arrangements are attained followed by a higher-level coalition arrangement. For example, if at first, only bi-lateral cooperation arrangements were established in a basin with three riparians, a second phase could include a grand coalition of all three riparians.
An attractive and economically sustainable regional cooperative arrangement must fulfill, what are known in economics, as individual and group rationality. That is, the regional cooperative outcome is preferable to the noncooperative outcome for each participant (individual rationality). In addition, the regional cooperative outcome for each participant is preferable to outcomes from any partial cooperative arrangement that includes a subset of the regional participants (group rationality). The regional cooperative arrangement also requires that all costs or gains are allocated or accounted for. This means, at least in theory, that all costsdirect and indirect, internal and external -that are associated with cooperation can be identified and included in the cooperative agreement. We will address these points in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
To further demonstrate the potential role of economic principles in regional cooperation, we can borrow from the field of international trade and investment (Moran, 1996) , although water and water-related activities are not as easy to trade or handle as other commodities. Since globalization of economic activity can be a source of benefit and harmony among trading nations on the one hand, this can also create conflicts because of unfair trading practices. As domestic trade and production policies can affect international trade, other domestic policies can impact the stability of water-sharing arrangements as well.
Economics and politics play interactive roles in the evaluation of regional cooperation. Just as political considerations can effectively veto a joint project with an otherwise favorable economic outcome, a project with potential regional-welfare improvements might influence the political decision-making process to allow the necessary cooperation. Therefore, economic and political considerations should be incorporated into regional cooperation evaluations. Several works demonstrate these issues. Dinar and Wolf (1994a , 1994b argue that economic efficiency alone is not sufficient for cooperation, especially when it is related to the allocation of a scarce resource, such as water, among hostile potential cooperators. Furthermore, the authors develop a framework for analyzing economic and political aspects of cooperation and demonstrate, using the case of trading Nile water, how regional cooperative arrangements based only on economic considerations are inferior to arrangements that likewise take into account political considerations. LeMarquand (1977) provides a general conceptual framework for considering international river cooperation, taking into account hydrologic, economic, and political aspects. The conceptual framework identifies three sets of factors, each containing several variables that establish general patterns of incentives and disincentives for cooperation. The three sets are the Hydrologic-Economic relations among the potential cooperators, the Foreign Policy of each potential cooperator (regarding relevant issues), and each potential cooperator's Domestic Policy and Consensus. The Hydrologic-Economic set can be viewed as a necessary condition for cooperation. Consequently, Foreign Policy, which is affected by Domestic Policy and Consensus, may decay or enhance cooperation. However, this framework does not include an important set of factors: the power of a potential cooperating party to prevent the establishment of other coalitions. Another potential drawback to this approach is its lack of quantitative measurements for the various factor sets and variables used.
Few studies address the sustainability of a cooperative arrangement once an agreement has been reached. Morrow (1994) identifies four problems associated with sustainability of cooperative solutions: sanctioning, monitoring, distribution, and information. All four activities are varied as to their impacts on the stability of the cooperative arrangement. A distributional problem arises when the actors have different preferences regarding the cooperative arrangement. An information problem likewise occurs when the actors are uncertain of the value of the different cooperative arrangements, and may benefit by sharing knowledge. Assuming that the parties reveal their true interests by signing a cooperative agreement, there is no need, in theory, to enforce and sanction. However, problems with monitoring, enforcing, and sanctioning (in cases of defection) in a cooperative environment, which are subject to the ex post noncooperative behavior of some parties, are very relevant yet difficult to resolve as well. For example, monitoring and enforcing a cooperative agreement may be expensive and difficult because it requires acquiring complicated information. The distribution of relevant information among the signatories is one of the key factors in the effective implementation of a cooperative agreement.
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND COOPERATION
Cooperation may also be associated also with strategic behavior. Clearly, international water issues depend on interactions among states where one player's decision depends, to some extent, on the choice of another player (or other players). This is often called a "strategic choice." By working out the logic behind purposeful behavior of actors involved in some strategic interaction, it is possible to determine how individuals ought to make choices in a particular interaction if they adhere to principles of rationality. The principles of rational choice require that the players' behaviors are motivated by their own personal or group goals and values. These, in turn, may be modified by the parties' updated expectations (as situation changes) and the available constrained by resources and the rules of the institutional context in which they operate. In the jargon of game theory, a game's outcome depends upon the set of feasible outcomes, participants' choices, and the rules of the game (see also Chapters 5 and 6).
When the demand of a population for water in a river basin begins to approach its supply, the inhabitants have three choices. These options are equally applicable to the problems facing inhabitants of a single basin that includes two or more political entities. Each of these options can also be modeled (Falkenmark, 1989; LeMarquand, 1977) :
1. The inhabitants may work unilaterally within the basin (or state) to increase supply -through wastewater reclamation, desalination, or increasing catchment or storage -or decrease demand, through conservation or greater efficiency in agricultural practices. 2. The inhabitants of a basin may cooperate with the inhabitants of other basins for a more efficient interbasin distribution of water resources. This usually involves a transfer of water from the basin with greater water resources. 3. The inhabitants may essentially do nothing and face each cycle of drought with increasing hardship. This is the option most often chosen by countries that are less developed or are wracked by military strife.
Although the last alternative may seem unreasonable, game theoretic models can help explaining how nations may make choices, which lead to such choice due to the nature of their underlying interests and the strategic structure of the game itself. The modeler can then try to make prescriptions in such cases to change the contexts, leading to more efficient and welfare-enhancing outcomes.
The principles described above address cooperation and focus in particular on issues such as time consideration, grand coalition/partial cooperation, and expansion of the scope of cooperative activities. The following sections show that cooperative strategies almost always address such issues. Questions such as when to activate a certain feature in the cooperation arrangement, whether or not to wait for the entire set of parties to agree on cooperation (as was discussed earlier in this chapter), and whether or not to address the issue under dispute or to involve more issues that may enhance cooperation are taken into consideration by basin states in an attempt to deal with a water dispute.
COOPERATION IN MANAGING WATER AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Both conflict and cooperation combine a mix of economic and political variables. Some scholars see conflict as the norm and consider cooperation to be rare. Others believe that relations between various interest groups resemble a variety of rules, norms, and a wide spectrum of political interests, all of which facilitate a cooperative environment (Stein, 1990) . Analyses of conflict situations and cooperative solutions suggest that the general observations made by Stein (1990) hold for the case of water as well, which is a source for conflict, but likewise be a basis for cooperation. For a detailed analysis, see Chapter 9.
Sharing water resources is a global problem, since international river and lake basins comprise nearly 50% of the world's continental land area (United Nations, 1978) . In Africa, Asia, and South America, this proportion rises to at least 60% (Barrett, 1994) . The economic and political cost of unresolved international water conflicts are very significant. Economic development of river basins may often be delayed or halted. In addition, short-term and long-term damages (such as pollution) to the parties may occur as a result of a unilateral action taken by another party. Finally, indirect social costs may also be the result of such conflicts.
There are several ways in which cooperative international river development offers possibilities for mutual gain (Krutilla, 1969) . For example, an upstream riparian may wish to undertake flood-control measures on its reaches of the river so as to provide protection from floods and likewise improve the river's flow. Krutilla (1969) argues that, cooperative participation in design and scale, and mutually planned sharing of costs and attendant benefits, are likely to lead to more effective exploitation of the river's potential than if each party were to take an independent course of action, ignoring off-site effects. In general, where interdependencies exist, pooling the resource potential of an entire river system offers a wider range of technically feasible alternatives, and by avoiding investment duplication, an opportunity arises to select the most economical combination of sites and measures for attaining mutually desired objectives.
Although, conflicts over water resources are very common, there are a large number of cases where solutions were found, either among all the basin riparians or only some of them. They include one case involving 12 of the 15 riparian countries (Danube), three cases involving nine (out of ten) (Nile), and eleven riparians (Niger, Congo), three cases involving four of six riparians (Chad, Volta, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Mekong) two cases involving two of five riparians (La Plata, Elbe), nine of four riparians, 30 of three and at least 148 of two (Source: Panel of Experts on the Legal and Institutional Aspects of International Water Resources Development (1975) , quoted by Barrett on page 2, Annex VII).
An important empirical example of the value of basin-wide cooperation in the Ganges is provided in Rogers (1969 Rogers ( , 1993 in relation, to the Ganges-Brahmaputra. Using a game theoretical model, the study shows Nepal, India, and Bangladesh should be better off cooperating over a set of possible regional water-related projects. In reality, cooperation, as attractive as it seems in models, has not been practiced in that region for reasons related to trust and regional politics. Only recently, in December 1996, was a water treaty signed between India and Bangladesh, which addresses water-sharing issues at the Farakka Dam.
Even when, cooperation does transpire, it does not always proceed smoothly and in some cases fails altogether. Failure to cooperate is usually explained by (a) technical complexity of the cooperative project, such as the data collection and sharing project by the ten Nile Basin riparian countries; (b) ill-defined rights and responsibilities of each riparian, such as the United States and Mexico dispute over the Colorado water where the quantity aspects were well defined but the water quality issues were left undefined; (c) existence of differing goals that cannot be represented by a simple balance of costs and gains to the riparians concerned, such as the ground water issues -that actually transcend ground water extraction rulesbetween the Israelis and the Palestinians; and (d) existence of wider considerations among the riparians and other stakeholders, such as the case of Chad and Nigeria over the Lake Chad water islands.
The above examples demonstrate that the effective joint management of international waters often depends on the opportunities embodied in cooperation and collaboration vis-à-vis water development and management, and other related regional issues of interest to the countries. In addition, it is becoming increasingly clear that a variety of factors tend to preclude cooperative management within basins. (Here we use the term cooperative management also to address the resolution of conflicts, which need some degree of cooperation.) These factors may include unequal power and hostile political relations between riparians, or an especially large number of riparian states. For sure any successful basin-wide arrangement evolving in the face of these factors has been a result of strong NGO or other third-party involvement, roles that have been taken up with increasing reluctance (Bingham et al., 1994) .
Even though it is suggested that the likelihood of a basin-wide arrangement is less attainable because of existing externalities affecting the riparians' levels of utility (Just and Netanyahu, 1998) , there are two issues that need further attention. First, mechanisms can be put in place that will reduce and even eliminate the externality impacts, hence promote basin-wide cooperative water arrangements. Such mechanisms may include river basin authorities, or step-wise agreementssuch as was the case in the Danube River Basin (Linnerooth, 1990) , or in the cases of the Mekong and the Aral Sea Basins (Kirmani and Le Moigne, 1997) , and information collection and dissemination systems that are becoming more and more affordable and acceptable in various parts of the world (Kilgour and Dinar, 1995) . Second, even if a partial cooperation arrangement is more likely to develop in the basin in the short-and medium-run, the longer-term prospect for such arrangements are gloomy in light of previous empirical evidence (Kaufman et al., 1997) . For that reason, it is important, in case of less-than-basin-wide arrangements to identify preconflict symptoms that may or may not develop, and that their dynamics is not expected.
In a more practical way, Kally (1989) , while evaluating the potential for cooperation in water resources development between Middle East countries, examines a particular approach that is based on individual water-related projects among two or more parties in the region. It should be noted that in Kally's approach, the water-related projects cut across basins and do not focus on a particular basin. The author suggests that it is possible to envisage different combinations of various projects of potential interest to the particular parties as well as to all parties in the region. However, political considerations other than those related directly to water are likely to determine the level of cooperation in the region and the particular subset of projects to be selected.
For Further Discussion. The sets of principles for cooperation suggested by Bogardus, Krutilla, and LeMarquand include items that are unique to each set, items that are similar across these three sets, and items that are complementary to each other. Let us compare the set along the lines of that typology. 9.75in x 6.5in ch04 FA1
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CASES OF COOPERATION
There are a variety of successful and less successful experiences of cooperation between riparian countries over the development and management of a river basin. Several examples detailing the experience of various river basin organizations from Africa are found in Rangeley et al. (1994) . One successful and long standing example of international river basin cooperation in Africa is that of the Senegal River (LeMarquand, 1990) . The dispute began during the French colonial era yet and continued after the independence of three of the Basin states: Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. Despite the Senegal River's importance for understanding cooperation over water, we shall briefly discuss the following cases: the Mekong River Basin, the Danube River Basin, the Aral Sea Basin and the Jordan Basin. The Mekong example demonstrates the value of cooperation even during times of war. The Danube Strategic Action Plan is an example of how the riparian states of the Danube River Basin established an integrated program for the basin-wide control of water quality. This was the first large scale initiative known for its activity and success. The Aral Sea Water and Environment Program is the least mature of the four examples, but is in itself a major achievement. The Jordan Basin is an example of riparian states to agree on a cooperative agreement over water allocation in a region with highly variable water supplies and a long history of political hostility.
The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin (see also Case Study 2) spans about 1.2 million square kilometers and is inhabited by 500 million people, includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and India. This region appears to have exceptional opportunities for development. It is richly endowed with natural resources. It boasts of one of the world's largest sources of rich water resources, hydropower, coal, gas, and land, and a network of water ways for international transportation.
Following some empirical work on the value of cooperation in water resources management (Rogers, 1993) , the World Bank, in 1996, initiated a study to assess the transboundary opportunities for regional development (ASTEN, 1997). Table 4 .1 presents an outline of the issues and cooperative options facing the region. Following recent developments in transboundary water and energy arrangements (Salman, 1997; Rogers and Harshadeep, 1997) , a window of opportunity has been created for promoting cooperative approaches and planning a shared vision for sustainable regional development including poverty alleviation.
Although water is the principle disputed resource among three of the region's countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal), the World Bank study adopted the "expanding the cake" approach, which takes into consideration other resources than water to facilitate cooperation. Table 4 .1 provides the set of issues that were included in the negotiations, such as energy, logistics, and the environment. Bridges Over Water Source: Adapted from ASTEN, (1997).
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The Mekong Basin
The Mekong River (see also Case Study 1) rises in China and flows through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Mekong case reveals the successful application of a comprehensive development approach in an international river basin. That being said, it is one of the least developed major rivers in the world, in part because of difficulties inherent in implementing joint management among its diverse riparian states. Specifically, China and Myanmar located upstream have had little interest in regional cooperation. At the same time, their individual development plans did not overly trouble the downstream riparian states (although today China's prospective projects on the Mekong are raising concerns). The downstream countries, though acknowledging the potential benefits to be drawn from the river, could not find the financial resources for joint development or a mechanism to overcome their divergent interests. Nonetheless a formal international basis for cooperation was established in 1957 when the Mekong Committee was created, comprised of representatives from the four downstream riparian states. Programs for developing the resources of the Mekong for irrigation, navigation, power, and flood control were advanced with support from the United Nations, Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and other donor countries.
The Committee's mandate is to prepare and submit to participating governments plans for coordinated research, study, and investigation. In addition, the committee is charged with making requests on behalf of the governments for special financial assistance and for receiving and administering these funds. Finally, the Committee is responsible for drawing up and recommending governments criteria for use of the water for development purposes. All four representatives must attend all Committee meetings, and any decision must be unanimous. Meetings are held three to four times a year, and leadership is rotated annually in alphabetical order by name of country.
With agreement among the riparians on priority issues, extensive international support was forthcoming. Along with the collection of physical data and the establishment of hydrographic networks, the Committee encouraged undertaking of economic and social studies and a regional training activity, including, programs for aerial mapping, surveying, and leveling. Navigation has also been improved along the river due to the Committee's work. The Committee also helped overcome mistrust among the riparians through increased integration. Laos and Thailand signed an agreement on developing the power potential on one of the Mekong tributaries inside Laos (Nam Ngun). This project provides electricity to Thailand and was financed by international funds. As a sign of the Committee's viability, the supply of electricity from Laos to Thailand and the payment in hard currency by Thailand to Laos was never interrupted, despite hostilities between the two countries.
During the 1970s, the Committee's momentum started to fade, and international support decreased. There were several reasons for this change, including: (1) political and financial obstacles that impeded the shift from data collection and studies to actual development projects; (2) the departure of Cambodia from the Committee in 1978, paralyzing its activity -it rejoined in 1991; (3) the divergent development objectives of the members, and (4) over-ambitious projects that were at times inconsistent with long-term needs (Bingham et al., 1994; Kirmani, 1990 ).
The Strategic Action Plan for the Danube (DSAP) River Basin, 1995-2005
The Danube River is shared by a number of riparians that for decades were allied with hostile political blocks, and consequently locked in tense ideological disputes. During the period of centralized planning, the central and eastern European countries did not develop full environmental protection policies to respond to the degradation of the river. Legal standards for environmental quality were often unenforced or unenforceable. Apart from Germany and Austria, all other Danube countries are currently undergoing fundamental transformation of their political, legal, administrative, economic, and social systems. For additional information, on legal aspects relating to water management, see Chapter 3.
Recognizing the increasing degradation of water quality, in 1985 the (at that time) eight riparians of the Danube signed the "Declaration of the Danube Countries to Cooperate on Questions Concerning the Water Management of the Danube," also known as the Bucharest Declaration. It committed the riparian states to a regional, integrated approach to river basin management. Basin-wide coordination was strengthened at a meeting in Sofia in September 1991, in which the riparians elaborated on a plan for protecting the water quality of the Danube. At that meeting, the countries and interested international institutions, including the World Bank and UNDP, met to draw up an initiative to support and reinforce national actions for the restoration and protection of the Danube River. The countries and donors established a Task Force to oversee the program, which covers monitoring, data collection and assessment, emergency response systems, and preinvestment activities. A Program Coordination Unit was likewise established to monitor the day-to-day activities of the Environmental Program.
In 1991, as part of the overall Danube Environmental Program, each riparian country identified a country coordinator and a person to serve as a country "focal point". These individuals would be the liaisons to the Program Coordination Unit in Brussels (now in Vienna). Both the coordinator and focal point were also members of the Task Force. The country coordinator was usually from a ministerial or other political position. The focal point was a technical person who handled the day to day issues of the country team.
The public consultation process that was designed to guide and support the development of the DSAP in 1994 required a facilitator from each country who had some technical background either in water or environment. The local facilitator organized and ran the local public consultation meetings in each of the nine countries, based on an agreed design. The World Bank designed and initiated the format of the consultation process, including training sessions.
A major accomplishment of the Danube public consultation was the development of a Strategic Action Plan for the Danube River Basin, which was adopted by the Task Force in October 1994, and ratified by the countries' respective water or environment ministers in December 1994, in Bucharest. In late 1993 and early 1994, another major Danube River activity was being carried out in the basinthe Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube (the Danube River Protection Convention). The Danube River Protection Convention aims to achieve sustainable and equitable water management in the basin and was ratified in June 1994, in Sofia (Task Force for the Programme, 1995).
Water and Environmental Management in the Aral Sea Basin
The Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers constitute The Aral Sea Basin (see also Case Study 4). The Basin covers parts of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small area of Afghanistan. River water has played a vital role in the economic and social life of these arid Central Asian countries. In the 1960s, resulting from Soviet irrigation projects, water was withdrawn from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya before being discharged into the Aral Sea and was conveyed to remote desert areas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The water has been used mainly for irrigation of cotton and rice, using very inefficient irrigation technologies. This has resulted in decreasing water level, a reduction in the lake's area, and increased salinity levels in the water (Ayres et al., 1996) .
The marked reduction in the lake's size has resulted in significant climatic changes in the region, including lower temperatures, reduced snowfall (thus reduced snowmelt), and further diminished river flow. Additional effects include wind erosion and salt deposits, which cause damage to crops, power lines, concrete structures, and land fertility, as well as severe health problems among the region's population. Specifically, the water level of the Aral Sea has dropped from 53.3 to 39 m above sea level, and salinity content tripled from 10 to 28 g/l between 1960 and 1989. If no action is taken, the water level is expected to fall to 32 m, and the salinity content will increase to 65 g/l in the year 2000 (Ayers et al., 1996) (No updated observations beyond the year 2000 are available. See also Case Study 4 (Aral Sea) for water quantity and quality information.) In addition aquifer levels have dropped, and aquifer water quality has deteriorated significantly. Forest areas have declined, and in many places disappeared. Navigation of the lake is impossible now, and fish stock have practically disappeared. All the fish for the region's canning industry, once brought from the Aral Sea, is now imported from other regions.
The basin countries recognize the gains to be realized from a basin-wide effort to address the causes of the crisis. The five states -Afghanistan does not participate in this effort -are exploring means for deepening interstate cooperation. Some of the cooperative endeavors considered include rehabilitating and stabilizing the environment of the Aral Sea, improving the management of the international waters of the basin, and building up the capacity of regional institutions to deal with water management in the region (World Bank, 1997) .
A detailed regional water resource management strategy was agreed upon by the basin states. The strategy includes interstate water-sharing agreements, sharing of information, and monitoring of the international water ways in the Basin. The expected benefits from regional cooperation are substantial and drive the actions of individual states.
The Jordan River Basin
Water is one of the major issues addressed in the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. In fact, the treaty could likely be used as a possible model for other river basins.
Cooperation between the two states is based on mutual recognition of their reliance on different joint sources (Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers' and the Arava ground waters) and that ". . . water can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them . . ." (Jordan Times, 1994:6) . Water-related cooperation between Jordan and Israel is also based on the understanding that any joint undertaking of management and development of these water resources will not harm the water resources of the other party. The agreement also stipulates the need to explore water augmenting options due to the inadequate availability of existing water resources.
The alternative options that the two riparians considered for advancing cooperation and alleviating water shortage include: (1) development of existing and new water resources; (2) prevention of contamination of water resources; (3) mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages; and (4) transfer of water-related information and knowledge.
The 1994 treaty ensures proper implementation of the various items by including a description of various steps and actions that acknowledge both historical usage, present needs, and water origin. Examples include: (1) allocation rules for water from the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers during various seasons; (2) operation and maintenance schemes of sources in one state's jurisdiction supplied to the other state; (3) development and operation of joint storage systems; (4) joint monitoring of water quality, and (5) joint management of ground water wells in the Arava Valley, recognizing existing pumping schemes.
In his book Diplomacy on the Jordan, Haddadin (2002:442) provides telling evidence for the state of water cooperation between Israel and Jordan: ". . . the cooperation between Israel and Jordan, in general, was going downhill because of the Likud policy toward peace and the Palestinians. Water, on the other hand, continued to flow and proved to be an element of cooperation for the benefit of both sides. The water that the treaty brought saved Jordan from devastating effects of drought that lasted from March 1998 to January 2000. Israel honored most of her commitments to Jordan, at a time when she badly needed the water herself (The Israeli Water Commissioner announced, in April 1999, that he was cutting irrigation water to 40% of the usual quantities. He went to say that he did not have water to give Jordan either. But the flow to Jordan continued until the level in Lake Tiberias got to the Red Line)".
For Further Discussion. Referring to the Rio Grande and Euphrates Basins that were presented in Chapter 3, using the set of principles suggested by Bogardus, Krutilla, and LeMargquand, explain which of the principles function and which does not function in each of the two basins.
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR COOPERATION
Several variables form the basis for international cooperation over natural resources. They include: (1) developing incentives for voluntary cooperation, (2) developing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with cooperation arrangements, (3) creating institutional structures for managing potential conflicts, and (4) addressing third-party effects.
The lessons learned from past experience suggest that integrated international resource management will be best implemented before conflict develops. Cooperative development plans will also be more stable if they link as many components as possible (e.g., linking water quality with quantity and surface with groundwater sources. Annex A4 to this chapter proposes generic strategy for regional cooperation on transboundary water.)
Creating incentives for voluntary cooperation among riparians in an international river basin may be accomplished either by targeting a broad set of issues of interest to all riparians, or by ensuring an attractive outcome, or by providing linkages to out-of-basin activities. The role of a third party in the process of resolving existing conflicts, or preventing potential future conflicts, is crucial.
A list of rules of thumb (Bingham et al., 1994) for reducing the likelihood of conflicts and laying the foundation for international river basin cooperative management may include:
1. focusing on interests underlying each riparian's position; 2. sharing information; 3. developing strategies for joint fact finding; 4. expanding the set of alternative development options; 5. preventing asymmetrical outcomes; 6. developing mechanisms for transparent and fair allocation of joint gains from cooperation.
When the negotiation of a grand coalition is not viable, an alternative approach to achieving regional cooperation is the creation of partial-coalition agreements. Bridges Over Water Table A4 .1: Strategies for river basin cooperation.
Strategic goal Specific items
Strengthening policy and regulation, both domestic and international
(1) Building and strengthening local capacity (2) Strengthening and improving data and information collection and analysis systems, and sharing of data and information 
